Strategy to Promote the Effectiveness of Technology Transfer of National R&D Programs in Korea: Seen through the G7 Leading Technology Development Program  by Oh, Sea-Hong et al.
 Procedia Computer Science  91 ( 2016 )  221 – 229 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
1877-0509 © 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ITQM 2016
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2016.07.061 
ScienceDirect
Information Technology and Quantitative Management (ITQM 2016) 
Strategy to Promote the Effectiveness of Technology Transfer of 
National R&D Programs in Korea: Seen through the G7 Leading 
Technology Development Program 
Sea-Hong Oha, Hee Young Limb, Byoungsoo Kimc,* 
a Korea Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning, 68, Mabang-ro, Seocho-gu, Seoul, 06775, Republic of Korea 
b Korea Institute of Public Administration, 235, Jinheung-ro, Eunpyeong-gu, Seoul, 03367, Republic of Korea 
c Korea Agency for Infrastructure Technology Advancement, 286, Simindae-ro, Dongan-gu, Anyang-si, Gyeonggi-do, 14066, Republic of 
Korea 
Abstract 
The G7 Leading Technology Develop Program (G7 Program), a national R&D program (NRDP) in Korea that was funded 
during the years between 1992 and 2001, served as a cornerstone in boosting Korea's major industries such as 
semiconductor, information & communications, electronics, and automobile. Overall, this program has been recognized as a 
typical success model of large-scale government-wide NRDPs from the technology planning phase to the 
commercialization planning phase. Now more than a decade has passed since the G7 Program ended. This paper at this 
moment aimed to examine strategies to promote the effectiveness of technology transfer of NRDPs with the G7 Program as 
a case study. The conceptual scope of the effectiveness of technology transfer covered the overall macroscopic outcome of 
NRDPs rather than microscopic outcomes, and this study explored the pathway of technology planning of the G7 Program 
and the success rates of G7 projects. In so doing, we reached the conclusion that strategic planning helped promote the 
effectiveness of technology transfer by identifying future-oriented and promising R&D items that held the potential for 
leading their own markets, thereby translating their R&D outcomes into commercialization. 
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1. Introduction 
Korea has been investing in R&D as its top policy priority to develop and nurture key technology over the 
years. National R&D Programs (NRDP) initiated in 1982 constitute one of the policy tools for the Korean 
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government in making R&D investment, and have driven the nation’s economic development while creating 
national growth engines. Korea’s R&D investment measured against GDP amounted to 4.15% in 2013, which 
places Korea at the top among all OECD members. The Korean government accounts for approximately 25% 
of this while the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning and 
Ministry of Health and Welfare are playing a leading role in undertaking wide-ranging R&D programs on a 
governmental level. 
Fig. 1. R&D Investment Measured against GDP (Source: OECD S&T, Industry Scoreboard 2015) 
 
NRDPs are generally designed to support R&D in the pre-commercialization phase. In numerous cases, 
however, the success of R&D achieved through NRDPs is not translated into success in the following 
commercialization phase, which increasingly fuels the need to improve the efficiency of NRDPs. DeCotiis & 
Dyer adopted five perspectives of producibility & business potential, technological results, efficiency, 
workforce development and technological innovation in assessing program outcomes on a subjective scale, and 
mentioned that the effectiveness of technology transfer of any NRDPs could be considered as one viable 
perspective taken to review program outcomes[1].  
Meanwhile, NRDPs that consist of dozens or hundreds of projects have rarely been a subject of research 
conducted to examine the relationship between the quantitative outcomes of NRDPs and their effectiveness of 
technology transfer.  Instead, studies undertaken in Korea primarily focused on the assessment of research 
outcomes (Comprehensive Assessment of G7 Leading Technology Development Program (G7 Program)), 
success stories (NRDP review and analysis) and success factors. For instance, Hong et al. suggested that 
factors related to the implementation of governmental R&D programs interact with one another and influence 
research outcomes[2]. Concerning the implementation structure of these programs, Hong et al. listed such key 
factors that affect research outcomes as project selection mechanisms, assessment on research actors, 
implementation modes (single mode, phased-in mode), time scope(short-term, mid/long-term) and management 
and assessment. The features of researchers and research projects, the implementation structure of research 
projects, incentive systems, and socio-economic background have impact on the research outcomes of 
governmental R&D projects. Ahn et al. classified Next Generation Growth Engines Program by 
implementation type (led by private sector businesses, jointly led by the government and private sectors, and 
led by the government), and identified main success factors that may be present in the R&D process (planning 
– execution – commercialization) by respective modes of implementation[3]. Ahn et al. intensively analyzed 
appropriate promotional strategies and market launching tactics in the commercialization phase.  
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This study aims to look at the effectiveness of technology transfer of NRDPs from the perspective of 
‘aggregate and effective transfer of outcomes’. Additionally, this study examines the concrete cases of planning 
the G7 Program so as to clarify differences when NRDPs are planned with or without taking into account the 
effectiveness of technology transfer. In so doing, this study will enable us to discover strategic implications in 
relation to improving the aggregate effectiveness of technology transfer of NRDPs. 
2. Fundamental Logic behind the Effectiveness of Technology Transfer of NRDPs 
Park et al. categorized the strategic management models of large-scale NRDPs into technology innovation 
strategy and technology innovation management system[4]. Technology innovation strategy refers to the 
selection, acquisition and use of technology to identify certain strategic areas (technology areas) with big 
potential, conduct R&D to secure technology required for technological innovation, and make the most use of 
acquired technology to generate fruitful outcomes. Meanwhile, any technology innovation management system 
refers to managerial systems and processes to support such strategy and often concerns the structured 
operational framework identified to support the implementation of NRDPs. Such strategic management model 
demonstrates that R&D projects can be successful when the advocacy of technology innovation strategy and 
the efficiency of technology innovation systems are systematically aligned together. Regarding NRDPs’ 
effectiveness of technology transfer, this, in turn, favors the macroscopic approach that highlights such 
performance indicators as technological and commercial outcomes, technological and industrial development 
and the growth of stock (knowledge creation and dissemination), rather than the microscopic approach that 
focuses on technological outcomes on a project level. 
 
Fig. 2. Conceptual Framework to Analyze the Effectiveness of NRDPs in Technology Transfer: Basic 
Framework(Micro Analysis) and Extended Concept(Macro Analysis)[4] 
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In principle, the effectiveness of NRDPs in technology transfer concerns a process that follows the 
generation of research output. Souder et al. defined technology transfer as the process of movement of 
technology from one entity to another[5]. In short, this is the process of technology moving from its developers 
or suppliers to those who demand such technology, or the process of technology moving from one department 
to another department. Camp & Sexton defined technology transfer as the transfer of technological knowledge, 
the process of delivering research outcomes to potential users and the route of technological ideas or know-how 
from the initial conceiving organization to the user organization[6]. In addressing the issues of technology 
transfer and commercialization of NRDPs, however, it is necessary that we extend the concept of effectiveness 
of technology transfer. That is to say, from the viewpoint of transformation or dissemination made to meet the 
‘intended purpose’ of NRDPs (e.g. strengthening innovation capacity or improving national competitiveness) it 
is recommended that this concept be expanded to include the production and transfer of aggregate knowledge 
stock. 
Taking the aggregate perspective shows that the success or failure of individual projects is influenced by 
diverse factors from the identification of individual projects that comprise NRDPs (including the identification 
of promising technology) to technology transfer and commercialization strategies and project management 
capacity. Attarzadeh & Ow presented the following three resolution types of research projects: first, project 
success (Resolution Type 1) means that the project is completed on-time, on-budget and fulfills all functions 
and features as specified; second, project challenged (Resolution Type 2) means that the project is completed 
and operational but over-budget, over the time estimate, and offers fewer functions and features than originally 
specified; third, project impaired (Resolution Type 3) means that the project is cancelled at some point during 
the development cycle for some reason[7]. Attarzadeh & Ow demonstrated that project success accounts for a 
mere 16.2% of the total while project challenged and project impaired account for 52.7% and 31.1% 
respectively. The success of NRDPs would be determined by whether their ‘intended purpose’ was satisfied 
through the success of individual research projects. This implies that the success rate of individual projects that 
constitute an entire NRDP can be used as a proxy indicator.  
3.  Effectiveness of Technology Transfer of the G7 Program 
3.1. Key Outcomes of the G7 Program 
One prime example of Korea’s NRDPs is the G7 Program. This program was initiated in 1992 on a 
government-wide level as a way to overcome the economic and industrial difficulties in the late 80’s, and its 
deadline was clearly defined as the year 2001[8]. Since its features and goals were defined in a strategic and 
detailed manner during the planning stage, the G7 Program was a “mission-oriented” program. At the time of 
launching the G7 Program back in 1992, a total of 18 G7 projects were selected: nine product technology 
development projects and another nine platform technology development projects. Out of these 18 projects, 
five of them were completed: one high-definition TV project in the 1st phase, two projects concerning new 
medicine and agricultural chemicals and next-generation semiconductors in the 2nd phase, and two projects 
concerning next-generation flat panel display and ASIC(application-specific integrated circuit) in the 3rd phase. 
Ultimately, 13 projects were undertaken until the set end-point[9]. 
To assess these G7 projects, interim monitoring research was conducted in respective phases in 1995 and 
1998. Nevertheless, this research was limited to micro-level assessments designed to determine whether 
individual projects would be “continued, supplemented or discontinued” and was highly “procedural” in its 
nature as an intermediate step to decide on the continuity of these projects into their next phase[10]. As a result 
of the final assessment and comprehensive review of G7 projects[11], one of them was graded highly excellent 
(next-generation flat panel display), 14 were graded excellent, one average and one below average. Regarding 
14 excellent projects, the key assessment criterion was whether these projects successfully reached their initial 
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target in the fields of semiconductors, BT, ET, precision machining, high-speed trains and next-generation 
automobiles. One human sensibility ergonomics project was identified as average due to the lack of consistency 
between the final R&D target and implementation strategy, and one next-generation superconducting project 
was rated below average due to its failure to attain the set target. 
Overall, the G7 Program has been considered as successful until now, and CDMA, high-density memory, 
and flat panel TVs represent some of the technologies developed through the G7 Program that became Korea’s 
flagship export products in the early 21st century[10]. Specifically, DRAM and CDMA technologies generated 
KRW 192.9 trillion in revenues by 2004, which far exceeds KRW 380.0 billion that was invested in their R&D, 
thereby contributing to the creation of national wealth as well as employment to a greater extent[12]. In the 
comprehensive assessment on G7 Program conducted by Ajou University and KISTEP, seven projects were 
chosen to analyze their outcomes by using analytical categories and indicators related to the enhancement of 
national science and technology capability, the establishment of industrial competitiveness and the 
improvement of the quality of life, and this analysis produced significantly positive conclusions. In particular, it 
was discovered that these projects were highly effective in laying the basis for R&D input, facilitating R&D 
activities and inducing further R&D endeavours in the category of enhancing national science and technology 
capability, which is also one of the major purposes of these projects. In the category of establishing industrial 
competitiveness, these projects were tremendously effective in helping participating enterprises improve their 
response to market changes and in enhancing corporate reputation[13]. Still yet, this analytical study was 
limited in that it relied on qualitative surveys that focused mainly on the rippling effects of these projects.  
3.2. Analysis of the G7 Program on its Effectiveness of Technology Transfer 
Analyzing the success rate of G7 projects is significantly meaningful in that this examines the NRDP’s 
effectiveness of technology transfer from the viewpoint of transfer of aggregate stock. The time scope of this 
analysis was set between 1995 and 2015, which is also the time period of the 1st Science and Technology (S&T) 
Foresight Study. Here, the year 1995 corresponds to the 2nd phase of the G7 Program and the official adoption 
of strategic S&T planning methods (e.g. future foresight) on a governmental level. 
The G7 projects' success rate analysis was designed to look at the technology foresight results used in the 2nd 
project planning phase of the G7 Program, and to examine the level of realization of those predicted 
technologies at the current time point in order to identify the success rate (effectiveness) of these projects. In 
conducting this study, analyzing these success rates was based on the assessment outcome data that, as a result 
of the 4th S&T Foresight Study, showed to what extent those future technologies, predicted by the 1st S&T 
Foresight Study, were realized, and these outcome data were matched to the list of G7 projects. 
One of the assumptions for this study was that out of the future technologies identified during the 1st S&T 
Foresight Study, those developed via the G7 Program and those that were not were different in their rate and 
time of realization due to multiple factors (increases in investment, concentration of resources, and stronger 
industry-academia-research institute cooperation), and that the greater these gaps were, the more successful G7 
projects were. 
As a result of the 1st S&T Foresight Study, a total of 1,174 future technologies were identified. Some of 
these technologies were excluded as assessing the time-point of their realization was believed to be impossible, 
which reduced the number of future technologies subject to the analysis to 1,109 (94.5%). Meanwhile, 
matching phase 1 G7 projects to target technologies of the 1st S&T Foresight Study revealed that 271 out of 
1,109 technologies could be aligned as in Table 1. In matching projects to technologies, it was discovered that 
some projects included just a few that could be aligned with technologies subject to the 1st S&T Foresight 
Study, which is attributed to the distinctiveness in the scope and characteristics of respective projects. For 
instance, environmental engineering and ASIC highly differ in terms of research areas included in respective 
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projects and the scope of technologies to be developed. This explains why big discrepancies exist in matching 
technologies related to specific projects to technologies subject to the 1st S&T Foresight Study. 
Table 1. Outcomes of Matching G7 Projects to Technologies Subject to the 1st S&T Foresight Study    
Project 
No. of Matching Technologies 
of the 1st S&T Foresight Study 
No. of Realized 
Technologies 
Realization Rate 
Subminiature Precision Machining 26 19 73.1% 
High-Definition TV 9 7 77.8% 
Next-Generation Semiconductors 4 4 100.0% 
Next-Generation Flat Panel Display 2 2 100.0% 
Application Specific Integrated Circuit 1 1 100.0% 
New Energy 18 8 44.4% 
Broad ISDN 2 1 50.0% 
Medical Engineering 52 20 38.5% 
Human Sensibility Ergonomics 1 1 100.0% 
Advanced Manufacturing System 43 18 41.9% 
Next-Generation Automobile 24 7 29.2% 
New Functional Biological Materials 11 5 45.5% 
New Medicine and Agricultural Chemicals 32 15 46.9% 
Environmental Engineering 33 15 45.5% 
Next-Generation Superconducting 2 1 50.0% 
Next-Generation Nuclear Reactor 7 5 71.4% 
High Speed Train 4 4 100.0% 
Total 271 133 49.1% 
             Note) As for advanced materials in the fields of information, electronics and energy, the scope of this segment itself is 
highly far-reaching, and thus relevant technologies were aligned to specific areas of materials under the G7 Program 
Out of these 271 technologies that could be aligned with the G7 Program, as many as 133 technologies or 
49.1% of the total were realized prior to the foresight period according to this study. This number is 
approximately 7% higher than 42.4% that was confirmed as a result of assessing the realization of technologies 
subject to the 1st S&T Foresight Study, which demonstrates that those technologies developed by the G7 
Program were realized relatively faster than those that were not. While partial realization was included in the 
scope of assessing the realization of technologies subject to the 1st S&T Foresight Study, such partial 
realization was excluded in reviewing G7 projects. This is because of the presumption that R&D outcomes 
should be realized to a level where they can be put to practical applications due to the inherent characteristics of 
the projects, and thus partial realization was not granted any meaning. Partial realization means that the 
concerned technology was the target of R&D with multiple purposes in mind and then only a portion of these 
purposes were satisfied. If you take as an example standard communication methods for factory automation(e.g. 
MAP network), these methods (standard communication methods for factory automation, MAP V1.0) were 
adopted by GM in 1984 but in Korea, only some technological progress was made and relevant technologies 
could not reach the commercialization phase 
Meanwhile, this analysis reviewed whether the success or failure of G7 projects resulted in any differences 
in terms of effectiveness of technology transfer or the realization of aggregate stock into technology transfer. 
As shown in Table 2, the success of analyzed projects was determined based on feedback from several experts 
who were involved in planning and managing G7 projects as well as the outcomes of research conducted until 
recently. This was followed by making comparisons between successful and failed projects based on their 
realization, and their results are shown as below. 
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Table 2. Determining the Success or Failure of Individual G7 Projects    
Project Outcomes Success or Failure 
Broadband ISDN Less practical application than expected Failure 
Human Sensibility Ergonomics Less sufficient applications than expected Failure 
New Medicine and Agricultural Chemicals Almost no outcome Failure 
Next-Generation Flat Panel Display Increase national capabilities in LCD, PDP Success 
Next-Generation Semiconductors Increase national capacities in market Success 
Next-Generation Nuclear Reactor Commercialized after R&D Success 
High Speed Train Industrialized after R&D Success 
 
Out of the technologies subject to the 1st S&T Foresight Study, 17 of them were aligned with the G7 
projects evaluated as successful(next-generation semiconductors, etc.), and 15 of these 17 technologies were 
realized. This is translated into the realization rate of 88.2%, which is tremendously higher than 42.4% shown 
as a result of the realization time assessment conducted as part of the 1st S&T Foresight Study as well as 49.1% 
which is the rate of realization of technologies aligned with G7 projects in Fig. 3. In contrast, a total of 35 
technologies subject to the 1st S&T Foresight Study were aligned with the G7 projects identified as failures, and 
only 17 of them were realized, which is translated to the realization rate of 48.6%. While this figure is 
relatively higher than 42.4% confirmed as a result of the realization time assessment conducted as part of the 1st 
S&T Foresight Study, this is slightly lower than 49.1% which is the realization rate of G7 projects.  
 
Fig. 3. Comparison of Technological Realization Based on the Success or Failure of G7 Projects 
4. Conclusions: Summary and Policy Implications 
As Korea’s investment in NRDPs is expanding to world-class levels, expectations for successful outcomes 
are increasing accordingly. Specifically, Korea’s ‘fast-follower’ approach that values the investment of input 
and quantitative growth is now facing limitations, and the nation is exploring new pathways towards 
leading(creative) technological innovation(Creative Economy) while shifting its focus to qualitative growth. 
One key issue here is how and how fast Korea could transfer ideas or R&D outcomes into the 
commercialization phase, and such key issue for NRDPs would lie in the creation and use of research outcomes 
in their concrete form.  
While studying the result of NRDPs has focused on output in measuring or evaluating their performance, 
few studies have been conducted on their effectiveness of technology transfer. Analyzing a wide range of 
previous research showed that taking the macro approach to review stock growth, rather than the micro 
approach, is more appropriate in analyzing the relationship between NRDPs and their effectiveness of 
228   Sea-Hong Oh et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  91 ( 2016 )  221 – 229 
technology transfer, and the conceptual analytical framework was designed as such.  
In particular, NRDPs’ effectiveness of technology transfer was understood as follows from the aggregate 
perspective by using as a proxy indicator the success rate of individual G7projects that were undertaken as 
large-scale, “mission-oriented”, and government-wide national R&D projects.  
First, those technologies whose R&D was conducted through the G7 Program showed a higher 
technological realization rate (49.1%>42.4%) than non-G7 technologies. This indirectly confirms that 
government-level assistance plays a relatively positive role in realizing any technology.  
Second, those technologies that fall into the category of G7 projects that were evaluated as successful 
showed a significantly higher rate of realization than the rest subject to this analysis (88.2%>49.1%). This 
proves that there could be a fairly strong correlation between the creation of highly practical research outcomes 
and the realization of technology.  
Third, even those technologies related to G7 projects that might be viewed as failures still showed a higher 
rate of realization than those technologies subject to the realization time assessment conducted as part of the 1st 
S&T Foresight Study (48.6%>42.1%). This demonstrates that technologies that receive full governmental 
support with a strong policy commitment are more likely to be realized than those which don’t benefit from 
such support.  
Due to their inherent characteristics, NRDPs encourage governmental R&D investment in developing basic 
and fundamental technology and applied technology. Nevertheless, adequate funding is not readily available in 
developing commercialization technology or in the early commercialization phase by utilizing such 
fundamental/applied technology. This is attributable to the fact that NRDP investment is intensively focused on 
R&D endeavours themselves, and that there is a lack of recognition and investment in the follow-up process to 
transfer and commercialize R&D outcomes so that they fuel the growth of the nation’s economy[14].  
Therefore, the Korean government is recommended to design NRDPs in a way to cross the ‘Death Valley’ 
that exists in the process of transferring and commercializing the outcomes of large-scale R&D projects. In 
other words, taking a strategic perspective from the phase of planning NRDP projects would be highly 
beneficial in creating a well-functioning linkage among R&D endeavours and the transfer of R&D results into 
commercialization & realization. This implies that such strategic viewpoint should be taken along the entire 
process of selecting, acquiring and using technology so that promising technology that may work in the market 
is identified, technology required for innovation is acquired through R&D and then acquired technology is fully 
utilized to generate outcomes.  
Furthermore, it is highly noteworthy that while researchers take the lead in undertaking R&D projects, a 
distinctive and separate strategic process needs to unfold systematically in order to commercialize acquired 
R&D outcomes. This is of utmost importance in strategically managing R&D projects, and presents significant 
implications for the current NRDP planning and management system whose main focus is on managing and 
improving the efficiency of R&D projects. 
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